Paradojas del mentiroso y dialeteísmo: un análisis del tratamiento de la paradoja del mentiroso en la motivación del dialeteísmo de Graham Priest

Rivas Robledo, Pablo

dc.contributor.advisor	Espejo Serna, Juan Camilo
dc.contributor.author	Rivas Robledo, Pablo
dc.date.accessioned	2021-01-28T16:40:23Z
dc.date.available	2021-01-28T16:40:23Z
dc.date.issued	2020-12-01
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10818/46610
dc.description	99 páginas	es_CO
dc.description.abstract	Con el advenimiento de la lógica moderna a principios del siglo XX, Frege y WhiteheadRussell incorporaron en sus lógicas el principio de explosión o Ex Quodlibet Contradictione (ECQ), según el cual de dos afirmaciones contradictorias entre sí se sigue cualquier otra afirmación.1 Presumiblemente, este principio tiene su origen en el siglo XII en la lógica de William de Soissons (Martin, 1986, p. 565) y tuvo una gran acogida entre pensadores posteriores, como Alexander de Neckham y el Pseudo-Escoto (Priest, 2007, p. 133). Como muchos temas de la lógica medieval, el principio de explosión pasó desapercibido en occidente hasta su reaparición en el siglo XX.	spa
dc.format	application/pdf	es_CO
dc.language.iso	spa	es_CO
dc.publisher	Universidad de La Sabana	es_CO
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.source	instname:Universidad de La Sabana	es_CO
dc.source	reponame:Intellectum Repositorio Universidad de La Sabana	es_CO
dc.title	Paradojas del mentiroso y dialeteísmo: un análisis del tratamiento de la paradoja del mentiroso en la motivación del dialeteísmo de Graham Priest	es_CO
dc.type	bachelorThesis	es_CO
dc.identifier.local	280477
dc.identifier.local	280477
dc.identifier.local	TE11098
dc.type.hasVersion	publishedVersion	es_CO
dc.rights.accessRights	openAccess	es_CO
dc.subject.armarc	Existencialismo	spa
dc.subject.armarc	Paradoja	spa
dc.subject.armarc	Filosofía	spa
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thesis.degree.discipline	Facultad de Filosofía y Ciencias Humanas	es_CO
thesis.degree.level	Filosofía	es_CO
thesis.degree.name	Filósofo	es_CO