

RWANDA: FROM POLITICAL BREAKDOWN TO... STABILITY?



Juan Sebastián López

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the Rwanda's economic & political stability in the post-1994 Genocide, determining if it should be a development model for the Africa's Great Lakes region. To enhance the theme, the text is divided in two sections: firstly, analyzes the pre-1994 political and ethnical conditions that lead to both 1994 Genocide and the political breakdown over anarchy. Secondly, evaluating the political order introduced by the Rwandan Patriotic Front after the Genocide and the capability of the regime for maintaining economic progress in the long term. The article aboard Rwanda's political order as a systemic authoritarianism, with arduous possibilities of economic growth in the long term. To attain a final consideration, international community's demands against the regime are reviewed and study cases of political repression in the XXI century are examined. Furthermore, economic progress is debated by analyzing the cost of public spending, the dependance from international credit loans and foreign aid.

Key Words: Genocide, authoritarianism, democracy, political parties, revolutions, colonialism.

INTRODUCCIÓN

Rwanda is a small 26,338 Km² landlocked country in the east of Africa. It's part of the Great Lakes region, bordering the DRC, Burundi and Uganda. This country, apparently insignificant & trivial, is responsible of the development of International Courts and is the scenario of a precedent over the creation of the International Crime Court (ICC).

From April 7th, 1994 to the 15 of July of 1994 one of the biggest atrocities world has seen took place in Rwanda. About 1,000,000 Rwandans were killed in a country that reported 6.2 million people for 1993.¹ This means that between April & July almost the of a country's population was killed. The reasons towards these events were plenty, but in few words, are the result of an outstanding ethnical division that permeate to the positions of power -in all its levels- & its manutention.

Rwanda's 1994 Genocide was the highest outcome of a tense relationship between the Tutsi's and Hutu's ethnical groups, that clash in a 4-year Civil War between 1991 and 1994. There's

a profound ethnical division in Rwanda with three main groups: Hutus, Tutsis and the Twas. Both Hutus and Tutsis represent 99% of the Rwandan population: Hutus are the greater majority by composing the 85% of Rwandans, Tutsis and Twas in the other hand take on the 14% & 1 % of Rwandan ethnical division, respectively. This differences between the two main groups, Hutu and Tutsi, is still debated. There is not a clear biological or anthropological settlement over the ethnical division. For some scholars, Hutus were the first groups to establish over the Great Lakes region while the Tutsis were nomads with no clearance of their origin.

Therefore, besides suffering from an important ethnical pluralism, Tutsis and Hutus coexisted in relative peace under a clan system during German colonial era in the nineteen century. Frictions appear when German occupation moved to the Belgians. Germany lost Rwanda as a result of the First World War in 1924 and as a result Belgium set on Rwanda with new extractive institutions that settle the bases for an implosive ethnical relationship.² Administrating Rwanda with ethnical policies such as personal mandatory identity cards that

¹ "Population, Total - Rwanda", World Bank, October 5, 2020, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POPTOTL?locations=RW>.

² "Outreach Programme on the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda and the United Nations", United Nations, October 5, 2020, <https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/historical-background.shtml>

were made to difference population between Hutus, Tutsis and Twas.

These different policies mixed up with structural socio-economic factors related with the position of power historically settled in Tutsi minority, stated the base for discrimination and belligerence. Belgians not only made a stronger differentiation of ethnical groups towards the self-recognition and relationship, but also stand on a greater social base for breakdown due to the recognition of power unequal distribution. While Hutus centered in crop production, Tutsis established their central economical activities in livestock, making Tutsis a minority in power -presented over the Belgian administration in the form of a Tutsi ruling monarchy.

Political breakdown was set for the Rwandan Civil War. Between Belgian colonial era Tutsis were receiving political privileges and a western-style education, this different and policies catalyze the creation of militarized factions of each of the ethnical groups -Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), for example- that lead to a constant structural destabilization of the country. Military coups, Tutsi and Hutu massacres and a passionate politics

that lead to breakdown in 1991 Civil War, and that leads, inevitably, to 1994 event.

Rwanda was a mess. Political instability characterizes the country on multiple forms and expresses in different factions take on power. After 1994 genocide, it was difficult to establish national prosperity for the country but, against all odds, contemporaneity Rwanda prove wrong -or at least it seems to.

Today, Rwanda is one of the highest growing economies in Africa. In 26 years, the country surpass from a scarcely US\$750 million GDP to a roaring 10 billion gross production in 2019.³ Despite being a relatively territorially disadvantaged country due to its geographical influence, Rwanda is a regional power with important relevance in African political development and international relations. Life expectancy has doubled, passing from 33.4 years of life expectancy since birth in 1990, to 68.7 years in 2018.⁴

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), that measures a country's life quality by borrowing from an annual GDP Per Capita, education

⁴ Gross Domestic Product: Rwanda," World Bank, November 1, 2020, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=RW>.

⁵ "Briefing note for countries on the 2019 Human Development Report: Rwanda," United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], October 5, 2020, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/RWA.pdf

access and life expectancy indicators measures Rwanda with a 0.536 HDI. This result may seem A priori irrelevant and could present as a contrary establishment against the current stability that was set. Therefore, there has been a greater 0.291 variability of country's HDI from 1990 to 2018. Actually, is the second country with highest growth in this indicator from year to year; between 2017 and 2018 it was just behind Zimbabwe. It is also, the country with greater regional prosperity towards the Great Lakes region.

But there's an actual stability in Rwanda for a long term? Is Rwanda a good prosperity example for both Africa and the Great lakes region? If so, how Rwanda has passed from one of the darkest pasts, to a future that seems to set prosperity?

In the following text, these questions are going to be addressed while analyzing the different national pillars that lead to both 1994 Civil War and today's prosperity. Structural aspects involving historical institutions adopted by colonialism, the scarcity of a national identity before 1994, and international influence that led to the adoption of a freer market & liberal politics will be also considered.

A Broader Review

Something has changed in Rwanda in the last 30 years, or at least it seems to. An institutional, cultural and structural change itself, seems -at minimum in the paper- to have occurred in the country. However, understanding if there has been an actual material difference in the country from the end of the 1994 genocide to the contemporaneity Rwanda, involves going deeper in the whole 1994 institutional and social structure of the country -that favors the understanding of the political breakdown- and the contemporaneous adopted institutions in respond to the systemic disintegration caused by the Civil War and the Genocide of the first half of 90s decade

Understanding the pre- & 1994 Rwanda: Context for political Breakdown

Cultural and ethnical fragmentation is a constant in African sovereignties; countries with multiethnic bases due to heterogeneous processes of societies mixed up with rigid country borders that left apart these considerations can be seen in multiple of sub-Saharan Africa. Rwanda, however, is not the case.

Cultural fragmentation in Rwanda is -and wasn't- as historically clear as in

some other cases. Actually, Rwanda's ethnical homogeneity is stronger than other African cases. As exposed by the United Nations Outreach Programme on the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, actually, ethnical division is limited to three ethnic groups: Tutsis, Hutus and Twas. This triethnical division is not as fragmented as it seems, as the Hutus made out the broader 85% of the population, the Tutsis do the 14% and the Twas made a 1%.⁵ However, ethnical understanding involves going deeper in the anthropological settlement of Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region historically.

There's a broader consensus between historians towards recognizing the Twas as the direct descendants of the first Rwandan inhabitants -ironically, they are the greater minority. First, occupiers of Rwanda were hunter-gatherers and forest-dwellers, understanding their recognized settlement in 2,000 B.C.⁶

3,000 years ago, around 1,000 A.D, there was a massive migration of proto-Bantu language speakers'

ancestors.⁷ It was a migration of farmers that involved the apparition of Hutu ethnical group family, which centered in the cultivation of dark and rich volcanic soils. From here, Hutu co-existed in relative peace with the Twas, centering themselves in agricultural matters, such as the cultivation of sorghum, or the recollection of resources by hunting. The interaction between both groups was integrational as they interrelate with each other in the exchange of goods as salt & iron.⁸

Hutu organization, however, led to the displacement of Twas in regard to the strength and competence in resource access. Hutu settle in vast communities organized in clans' societies. For the 15th century, territory was controlled by a dominant clan and "composed of several different lineages under a ruling lineage headed by a mwumi (chief or king). Who was a land chief as well as a ritual leader in charge of rain-making".⁹

For the time, between 11th or 15th century a vast pastoralist migration

⁵ "Outreach Programme on the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda".

⁶ Tor Sellström et al., "Historical perspective: some explanatory factors. Part I of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda", in *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience* (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996). <https://www.oecd.org/derec/unitedstates/50189653.pdf>

⁷ James Newman, *The peopling of Africa : a geographic interpretation*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), October 5, 2020, <https://archive.org/details/peoplingofafrica00newmrich/page/164/mode/2up?q=RWANDA>

⁸ Sellström et al., " Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda", 21

⁹ Jan Vansina, *L'Évolution du royaume Rwanda des origines à 1900*, (Brussels: Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre Mer, 1962).

related to Bantu speaking groups moved to the Great Lakes Region, leading to the establishment of the Tutsis.¹⁰ This led to the first assimilations between the two main contemporary ethnic groups in the landscape; these interactions were, therefore, pacifical, set in exchange of goods. Bos were exchanged with agricultural resources between each of the groups and benefited with common cultural matters towards the relationship over Bantu language common heritage.¹¹

Tutsis, however, advanced to positions of power as they take over the territorial order hegemony. This, throughout the establishment of structures, set towards direct coercion that led to the appropriation of the productive variables as the access to land & the exploitation of resources for primal accessibility.¹² Hutus, on the other hand, assumed the limitation of political strength, and restrained to administrative entities as part of a non-dominant ethnicity -despite being an absolute majority. This order was consequently undertaken with no relative menace between groups, leading to a relative harmonious landscape.

Structures of power were constant and visible for the 19th century, where social positions were well defined for ethnical recognition. Tutsis were clearly in dominant postures set in central political and military institutions that defined the clan system of Rwanda; Hutus permeate over production maintenance as farmers and Twas were relegated and marginalized to peripheral labors of society.

Tutsis were, never-the-less, adopted, culturally speaking. They assimilated Hutu traditions, language (Kinyarwanda), cults and world view. Because of it, probably, order was harmonical and non-disturbed, as the two ethnical groups shared the same hills, intermarry between them & shared the same names.¹³

This socio-political structure well defined between ethnical groups access to power and the maintenance of an accepted order balance changed dramatically for the XX century due to European empire influence. Belgian colonization in Rwanda in 1916, as a result of the World War I German's lost, set a group of conditions for breakdown. From the secession of Rwanda

¹⁰ G Gunn, H. D. Les Peuples Et Les Civilisations De L'Afrique, Suivi De Les Langues Et L'éducation. Par H. Baumann Et D. Westermann. Traduction Française Par L. Homburger. Préface De Théodore Monod. Payot: Paris, 1948. Pp. 605, 461 Figures, 23 Cartes. 1,000 Fr." Africa 19, no. 4 (1949): 339-40, doi:10.2307/1156411.

¹¹ Vansina, L'Évolution du royaume Rwanda des origines à 1900.

¹² Sellström et al., " Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda", 9.

¹³ Sellström et al., " Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda", 16

as part of the administrative dispensations, put to Belgium by the League of Nations, to the establishment of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, the Belgians will dispose over Rwanda with an administration that led to the disintegration of ethnical cohesion and even the “bastardization of indigenous social and political structures”.¹⁴

Belgians’ structural reformation of Rwanda led to the creation of greater differentiation of the ethnical groups through the promotion of policies that maximize political inequalities defined by ethnical recognition. Policies were made, catalyzed in generalized ideas Europeans have, in the thesis that there was a relation between race, ethnicity and progress. For Europeans, being a descendant of north African tribes, subgrouped in the result Caucasian, Aryan & Semitic cultures and races, was correlated with the socio-economic development of a society in Africa (Hamites). This idea was called the Hamitic theory.

Due to Hamitic theory, European colonialists’ belief that the “Hamitic race” was a superior African race

between the other Sub-saharan Africa races. This statement, that involved that physical characteristics have a relation with intelligence, express itself in segregative policies between ethnic groups that, until now, coexisted together; as for Europeans, Hamites were the African “natural leaders”, they must enjoy “from capabilities as noble as those of their European cousins”.¹⁵

Europeans recognized Tutsis as Hamites. Based in the established social power and a group of physical characteristics, Belgians affirm Tutsis were a “superior race” in regard to both Hutus and Twas. They correlate Tutsis by arguing, for example, that “his stature resembles more closely that of a white person rather than that of a negro - in fact, it would not be an exaggeration to state that he is a European who happens to have a black skin...”. With this in mind, Belgians asset a group of “Tutsification” reforms between 1920 & the mid-1930 that recognized Hutus as “indigenous Bantu people” and Tutsis as “Hamites”.¹⁷

¹⁴ Sellström et al., “ Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda”, 16

¹⁵ Ian Linden, “Church and Revolution in Rwanda”, in: *The Journal of African History* 19, no. 4 (Manchester University Press, 1977): 631–33. doi:10.1017/S0021853700016595

¹⁶ Joseph Gahama, *Le Burundi sous administration belge*. (Paris: CRA-Karthala-ACCT, 1983). https://www.persee.fr/doc/outre_0300-9513_1986_num_73_271_2536_t1_0240_0000_7

¹⁷ Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 117-120, <https://books.google.com.co/books?id=Ts2bDwAAQBAJ&I>

Tutsis, now, hegemonically established over all the structures of power; remained Hutu chiefs & deputy-chiefs were removed of power and replaced by Tutsi ones to monopolize political capital. Educational access was also restricted or discriminated as Tutsis were granted with direct access to European-style education through Catholic schools, Catholic religion adoption was also made by Tutsis, and this European world view was understand as superior. Hutus were relegated to education for mine & industry working.¹⁸ Tutsis were dramatically differenced with their correlatives, with new different cults, cultural beliefs and power positions adopted because of Europeans.

As if this dramatically discrimination wasn't enough, in 1933 Belgians imposed the Identity Cards policy. Looking forward in labeling publicly ethnical groups, every Rwandan have the obligation to register himself, based in the institutional criteria, as a Tutsi, Hutu or Twa.¹⁹ The cards, must be carried out publicly by Rwandans for recognition purposes; of course, this policy have a direct impact in ethnical recognition and a dramatic effect in the self-consciousness of dignity,

equality and self-value of each of the Rwandans. Bases were set to political breakdown.

In 1946, the United Nations Trusteeship Council granted Belgium with direct binding administrative recognition of Rwanda -Rwanda become a Belgium governed territory rather than a recommendative one-. Pre-conditions lead to Hutus gaining political momentum with continual ethnical inputs that were publicly made through political demands such as the Bahutu Manifesto of 1957; the document demanded a Hutu emancipation based in the popular majority that will be seen throughout the democratization of the country. Manifesto based in the "colonial thesis that Tutsi were outsiders/foreigners and claiming that Hutu -in majority- were true Rwandese nationals, and thus the rightful rulers of Rwanda".²⁰ With these precedents a Hutu centered political party, Parmehutu, was established and founded by Gregoire Kayibanda; it's main objective was evidently the Hutu emancipation. The party lead, then a total revolution of the political landscape. Through a belical opposition they set a revolution in 1959. A Hutu Peasant Revolution take into the

¹⁸ Catherine Newbury, *The cohesion of oppression: clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

¹⁹ Sellström et al., "Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda", 27.

²⁰ Sellström et al., "Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda", 28.

scenario with a Coup against Belgians and hundreds of Tutsis being brutally killed. About 120,000 Tutsis were, also, forced to leave from Rwanda to Burundi.

Rwanda's independence took place in 1962, and within the end of the historical Tutsi domination. The Hutu Revolution set Gregoire Kayibanda as President of Rwanda. On the other hand, the exhilarated Tutsis organized in structural groups that counterattack Hutus, as presented by the United Nations: "Ten such attacks occurred between 1962 and 1967, each leading to retaliatory killings of large numbers of Tutsi civilians in Rwanda and creating new waves of refugees." This criminal groups united in one whole macro-structure in 1988, leading to the creation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

Hutu regime led to the direct exclusion of Tutsi ethnicity gradually from political life and replaced by Hutus. As presented by Sellstrom & Wohlge-muth: "of the 43 Tutsi chiefs and 549 sub-chiefs in office in early November 1959, 21 and 314 respectively were eliminated through murder, expulsion or exile".²¹ Political tension was present.

1960 local elections were declared as illegitimate by the Tutsi parties as Parmehutu won 2,390 of 3,125 elected communal council seats. Tutsi parties, as the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) or the Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais (RADER), presented a public communication to the United Nations Trusteeship council, referring Parmehutu party leaders as "terrorists working in complicity with Belgian Administration".²²

In 1961 a referendum was made that could, also, define the political landscape. 1961 Rwandan monarchy referendum that responded to what should happen after the expected 1962 independence from Belgians: referendum asked Rwandese if the remaining Kigeli V king should continue being in head of the country, in form of a monarchy, & if the monarchy should be retained or abolished after independence. With 1,337,342 registered voters, and 1,274,631 active voters, the results were made. Only 253,963 (about 20.15% of the votes) were in favor of preserving the monarchy, while an absolute majority of 1,006,339 (79.8%) claim monarchy should be abolished. Votes towards Kigeli V weren't as different with a

²¹ Sellström et al., "Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda", 31.

²² United Nations Library, Petition from the "Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais (RADER)", the "Mouvement Pour l'Union Rwandaise (MUR)", the "Union des Masses Ruandaises (UMAR)", the "Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR)" and the "Mouvement Monarchiste Rwandais (MOMOR)" concerning Ruanda-Urundi (New York: United Nations, August 31, 1960), <https://digitalibrary.un.org/record/1658367?ln=es>

1,004,655 against its intention as king & only 257,510 in favor.²³

Referendum was not the only occurred 1961 political input. Parliamentary elections took place in that same year alongside the referendum. As expected, parliament move heavily to a Hutu majority with a 77.6% of the seats taken by, the radical Hutu emancipation party, Parmehutu, while the UNAR still maintained a considerable political pressure with 16.9% of the votes. Therefore, is inevitable to state the absolute majority Hutu now officially take towards political landscape power against Tutsis. Furthermore, the direct confrontations between both ethnical groups grow dramatically and increase exponentially, with the appearance of the Hutu vigilante committee.

In 1963, Juvénal Habyarimana was appointed as the head of Rwanda's national guard & then as the major general. With his approvance, Hutu vigilante committee move on with a bloody campaign against Tutsis, that was looking forward in ensuring "enforcement of the required ethnic quotas".²⁴ In that year, about 5000 to 8000 Tutsis were killed, including their 15 more relevant political leaders;

leading, for example, to the elimination of UNAR and RADER parties from the political power. President Kayibanda refused the use of this policy and was seen as weak by both the Parmehutu party and the Rwandan army, led by Habyarimana. These inputs lead to a coup d'état against the former President in 1973, led by Juvénal.

Two years after the coup, Habyarimana created his own party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement. Throughout a 1978 referendum, Habyarimana was able to make Rwanda a one-party system, due to the 89% votes in favor, with his party becoming the only legal political party in landscape. A one party controlled the whole political landscape; and it was seen firmly for the first time in the 1978 elections. With only one possible party to be elected, and being Habyarimana it's head, he become President, with 98.9% of all the votes in favor.

Total State authoritarianism over a One-Party System

In his book *Der Hüter der Verfassung* Carl Schmitt approaches the concept

²³ "Elections In Rwanda," African Elections Database, October, 2020, <http://africanelections.tripod.com/rw.html>.

²⁴ Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994* (London: Hurst & Co., 1998), 60, ISBN 9781850653721

of a Total State.²⁵ This concept only takes place when related to a society, a Total State borrows from the relation in between a government and a society and how, in what Schmitt defines as a “neutral” State, initially there should be a limit of how a government could interfere in society self-development. As presented by Voegelin, Hein, & Weiss, in the Schmitt total State, the “*coexistence of the two spheres with a minimum of intervention by one in the other [...] [is broke because] the state [is able] to intervene in society beyond this protective function and without society’s being further interested in the state’s self-enclosed organism*”.²⁶

Rwanda case can take over this total State definition. Habyarimana surpasses heavily its governmental functions by even attempting to the society core in hands of Tutsis. However, what a counterargument for looking Rwanda as a case of authoritarian study is that, therefore the coup & the political relegation of Tutsi minorities, there were democratical institutions that look forward in protecting political & civil

rights of the Rwandans. However, as Levitsky & Way will promote, an authoritarian State does not involve a formal institutional authoritarian establishment. Formal written institutions can be dramatically different against the de facto systemic form of the State. This hybrid regime can be the case of Rwanda more appropriately.²⁷

The referendum adopted 1978 constitution & establishes Rwanda as a democracy, firstly, in the preamble, when it started that “*the ideal of the free human being and enjoying all his rights can only be achieved if democratic institutions (...)*”; then, in the article 1, when directly stating that “*Rwanda is a democratic, social and sovereign republic*”. Therefore, institutional approaches are incompatible and useless for understanding the contextual & the systemic bases that lead to the authoritarian regime of Habyarimana and the Rwandan 1994 Genocide.²⁸

Rwanda’s case is hybrid. Steven Levitsky & Lucan Way refer to these

²⁵ Carl Schmitt, *Der Hüter der Verfassung* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1931), <https://ernster.com/annotstream/9783428149216/PDF/Schmitt-Carl/Der-HA%C2%BCter-der-Verfassung.pdf>

²⁶ Eric Voegelin, Gilbert Weiss, and Ruth Hein, *The Authoritarian State: an Essay on the Problem of the Austrian State*, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), 59, <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=cab06493a&AN=sab.000180332&lang=es&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

²⁷ Steven Levitsky, and Lucan Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism : Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. *Problems of International Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=nlebk&AN=331320&lang=es&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

²⁸ *Constitution Rwandaise [Const.]*. (1978)

²⁹ Levitsky and Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 6.

cases were democratical institutions exist and are well stated as fundamental bases of the State, but in which de facto State abuses are made.²⁹ And, therefore, political competition is null because opposition power is limited for contest. This set can be complemented with a liberal understanding by John Stuart Mill.³⁰ Habyarimana's political regime, that claims an institutional democracy, is empirically non-democratical due to the lack of choice present in a One-Party System. What 1978 constitution establishes in article 3, as the nation's bases, over "*Liberty, Cooperation, Progress*" as a fundament of democratical regimes, falls heavily in de facto contrariness. Mill establishes that the pluralism is a consequence of the use of liberty, as each individual will understand the world in a different way. State, then, must protect the use of this individual liberty and set the responsible use of it for State's self-develop. To protect this, State & society should not force individuals to a unique view of the world throughout custom but giving him the possibility for self-recognition in his living path. However, 1978 Constitution establishes a One-Party government that, at the end, imposes a morality and an ideal with no pos-

sibility of opposition. Democracy is inherently plural since it should persist in the possibility of choice. To this notion of real practical democratical institutions, Giovanni Sartori includes the necessity of *demo-protection*.³¹ For a real conception of empirical democratical regimes, voting individuals should not be afraid of exerting their liberties & rights, this was not the Rwandan case. Within, there are enough reasons to understanding pre-1994 Rwanda as an authoritarian regime.

Genocide, War & crisis: 1994

Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front was founded in Uganda in 1988 with the objective of reforming the historical political structures that country had & renewing them by imposing a political power sharing. For accomplishing its goal, it was, firstly, looking forward in the exiled Tutsis repatriation to Rwanda, to establish a new political regime from the ashes of the existent.

Political breakdown occurred in 1990. An estimation of around 7,000 RPF combatants invaded Rwanda

³⁰ John Mill, *On Liberty* (2 ed.), (London: John W.Parker & Son, 1860).

³¹ Ricardo Blaug, and John Schwarzmantel, *Democracy: A Reader*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 50, <https://gabrielaslotta.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/how-far-can-free-government-travel-sartori.pdf>

from Uganda. This act of war was understood by all the Hutus, as a Tutsi Coup against the established Hutu order, rapidly all the remaining Tutsis in Rwanda were threatened as accomplices and the political opposition Hutu members were labeled as traitors. Ethnic war catalogue campaign was set, and the breakdown began.

Habyarimana, that was in New York City at the United Nations World Summit for Children between 29 to 30 of September 1990, asked France to collective security insurance -then France dispatched troops in Rwanda to combat against the RPF. On October 2, Fred Rwigyema, founder of the RPF, was shot in the head and killed in battleground -this is considered as one of the main shots on morality of the RPF-; aggressors were pulled back to the northern front with Uganda and the 30 of October Habyarimana established the War was over. To counter the threat, therefore, United Nations claim for immediate international peace assurance between the combatants, that was set towards the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) by setting peace talks and a latter peace agreement between Hutu led government and the RPF, with a young Paul Kagame as a RPF peace

representative, in 1993. The cease of fire agreement set the 5 of January of 1994 establish a new multiethnic representative government by Habyarimana. However, in a clear violation with the agreed, Habyarimana filled its cabinet members with ministers from Hutu extremist parties. The peak of the political breakdown was starting to take place with these precedents.

The 6 of April of 1994, Habyarimana was killed. Presidential plane was shot down, resulting in the instant death of him & the President of Burundi. That same night, Rwandan Armed Forces & Hutu radical groups take on arms, set roadblocks and take on the Tutsi political leaders, and the Hutu members that were opposition -and were seen as traitors-. Tutsis with political influence were killed. A violent campaign against Tutsis started & the military interim government restart the direct military confrontation with the RPF as an answer of self-defense.³²

Within 24 hours of the airplane shot, all the Tutsis formal political leaders were killed³³ and the peak of breakdown was, then, reached. Genocide started & in 100 days almost 1,000,000 Tutsis were killed as an answer to both military actions by the Rwandan

³² Rwanda: Background," United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda [UNAMIR], October 5, 2020, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unamirFT.htm>

³³ Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (London: Arrow, 2005), 221-263, <https://archive.org/details/shakehandswithde00dall>

Armed Forces or armed Hutu civitas. Stability was crushed, ethnical fragmentation came to its peak with armed confrontations both military between the restart of the belical conflict with the RPF & in between the Rwandese with violent propogandas against Tutsi minorities by the Hutus.

Genocide, Propaganda & Breakdown

The events that started the 6 of April of 1994 and lengthened for 100 days see how a hate speech against Tutsis was made. Over the precedent of historical division in positions of power, and the assimilation of the Tutsis as foreigners that take on political landscape with no more than a Belgian coaction, Hutu were responsible of one of the most painful events of the closing 90s decade of the XX century. The word *Genocide* (*In capital letter from now on*) is many times misused, but it's a specifical word that was present in 1994.

The term takes international relevance in the frame of the Nuremberg trials as consequence of the Nazi Germany holocaust in the World War II. This led to a common assimilation

of the word Genocide by *the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*³⁴ were it commonly denominated "Genocide" in its article 2, when it stated Genocide as:

"any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

a. Killing members of the group

b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1948)."

³⁴ United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Paris: United Nations, 1948).

As Mikayla Lemonik exposes, Genocide is possible, probably, due to xenophobia. Modernity & pre-modernity saw how the concept of an ethnical & racial ideologies became possible, and the fear of foreigners set a key point for Genocide. In her words: *“Racial ideologies allow nations to distinguish between different groups of foreigners and declare some fit for continued existence and others for extermination. Furthermore, they encourage nations to see foreigners as essentially or biologically different and thus unfit for assimilation.”*³⁵

Racial ideology and xenophobia can explain well the Rwanda Genocide, but it's also important to set, that the formation of hate against the counterpart group is only possible due to a propaganda that embraces the intention of destroy and the des-humanization of the passive group. In fact, Hutu mobilization against Tutsis only take form due to the growing Hutu nationalism impuled throughout anti-Tutsi propaganda through radio channels.

Radhika Kapoor emphasizes in the use of propaganda in Rwandan case.

The 6 of April, 1994, media programs settle in extremism in the hands of Ferdinand Nahimana & Jean Bosco Barayagwiza; this two founded the media extremist channels, *Radio Télévision libre des Mille Colines & Kangura* paper. Through media, they demonized the Tutsis and centered hate by stating that Tutsis were violent and non-democratical people that needed to be controlled. For example, they said Tutsi leaders & civitas were “working towards their victory” for the final Hutu destruction, or claiming for violence when Habyarimana was shot down by calling for the “final war” to exterminate the Tutsis.³⁶

Hate propaganda that unleashed the historical ethnical divisions, mixed-up with the present xenophobia conception made by the Hutus against the Tutsis -as they understand Tutsis as “invaders” or foreigners that come next and take on positions of power- lead to the painful result. The intention of destroying Tutsi ethnicity form Rwanda. The Rwanda Genocide of 1994.

³⁵ Mikayla Lemonik, Genocide (Salem Press Encyclopedia, 2019)

³⁶ Radhika Kapoor, “Propaganda and Genocide: Setting Standards for Responsibility,” *Socio-Legal Review* 15, no. 1 (2019): 79–80, <https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/soclerev15&i=1>

Post-1994: Stability? & the Figure of Paul Kagame

Against all predictions contemporary Rwanda seems to reach certain stability. Is this a stability for long term? & if so, how did they make it?

The 7 of April of 1994, as a result of the massive killings & the violation of the Arusha peace accords, between the government and the RPF, a young Paul Kagame, accord delegate-representative of the RPF, state the unilateral comeback to a civil war by the RPF, if the Tutsi assassinations don't stop. As expected, military confrontations resumed by the north, and the RPF advanced quickly by taking control of Kigali countryside areas, accomplishing a pincer movement that encircled the flanks of the Rwandan military government officials. Furthermore, RPF incentive Tutsi members in Uganda to a return to the country by securing the back flanks. United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), that incentive the signing of the Arusha accords, prove incapable of stopping the fires and the 13 of June RPF take a majoritarian control of the country territory -leading to an interim government relocation- and the next month, July 4, they accomplished to

take control over the whole country, beating interim government.³⁷

With the RPF consolidation, militants set to establish a government of "National Unity" based in the Arusha accords. Pasteur Bizimungu was set as President, while Paul Kagame was established as Vice-President of the country as a RPF representative. Tensions started to deescalate, but the question here is if this "stabilization" is, really, "stable".

There are two positions towards the "Stabilization" country take. One, towards an authoritarianism established next to the RPF Civil War winning, that set an order based in repression, coercion and a liberal democracy façade. An another, of a prosperous country that advanced to a new era of order based in the principles of liberty and democracy reached as an answer to economic liberalization.

Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, centers in media as a catalyzer of political culture. In his article, *The media and the Rwandan Genocide*, edited by Allan Thompson, he goes deeper in the influence media had in prospecting hate propaganda that, inevitably, lead to the consolidation of the Tutsi Genocide. When addressing

³⁷ MDallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*

contemporary Rwanda, therefore, it emphasizes that the “peace” reached after 1994 is a consequence of a more pluralist media access or the access to an informational society in historically critical structural areas. However, it accepts that, while there is a present stability in nowadays Rwanda, it’s a result of government censorship for press, justifying it “as a necessary safeguard against the recrudescence of genocide”.³⁸

Reyntjens,³⁹ extends this thesis by presenting the authoritarian bases that settle on Rwanda as a consequence of 1994. After RPF power consolidation a censorship campaign become a political basis by prosecuting anyone whose loyalty to the regime seem doubtedly. Political landscape focused on authoritarianism, as the MDR party, the last party with certain autonomy from the RPF ideals, was banned in 2003. Media, in the other hand, was censored, as reporters were threatened or murdered.

As government critics accused President for corruption, and with multiple exponentially growing pressions, Bizimungu resigned in March -2000-, as

the President of Rwanda. With this, a former RPF militia & Vice-President, Paul Kagame succeeded to the government principal chair. This *interim* Presidential position take only several days. As the RPF, now as a party, selected Kagame as a President candidate. Parliament choose by 81 to 3 votes, Kagame as official President of Rwanda the 22 of April, 2000.

A new constitution was redacted & presented in 2003 by Kagame. It was voted by a referendum in 2003, passed by a 93% of votes & a 89.9% participation. The constitution preamble settles its bases in the crime of Genocide, and seem, institutionally speaking, liberal. It establishes a democratical State, where national sovereignty is popular & authoritarianism is virtually `banned`. In the article 54, the constitution recognizes a multiparty system for the country, were “*Political organisations fulfilling the conditions required by law may be formed and operate freely*”.⁴⁰

That same year, elections were set for choosing a President over the new constitutional structure adopted. Once again, RPF party selected Kagame as its representative. Firstly, its opponent

³⁸ Kofi Annan, *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, ed. Allan Thompson (London: Pluto Press, 2015). <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt18fs550>.

³⁹ Filip Reyntjens, “Behind the Facade of Rwanda’s Elections.” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 12, no. 2 (2011): 64–69, <https://search-ebshost-com.ez.unisabana.edu.co/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.geojaf12.33&lang=es&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

⁴⁰ Constitution Rwandaise [Const.] (2003).

Faustin Twagiramungu was a running choose by the MDR party, but since the *pre-constitutional government* banned the party, he was forced to run as independent. Being a `multi-party` elections, Kagame won with the 95.1% of the vote's scrutiny. International community accepted the results; therefore, a European Union observer claim there're "numerous irregularities" in the process.⁴¹

For Naftalin, Rwanda has achieved stability due to the liberalization of the economy. The country has accomplished an impressive annual 7.5% GDP growth since 2000, it is explained by a foreign trade investment; United Kingdom, for example, announced a bilateral aid of 535 million dollars, & Belgium did the same with a cooperation of 160 million euros.⁴² Also, economic growth due to the flexibilization to private sector officials and the advocacy to creating private enterprises. To this author, stability is present since Genocide and violence was condemned in form of the International Crime Tribunal of Rwanda, where it convicted both militaries and paramilitaries for crimes against humanity. Kagame government have been effi-

cient in institutional approach by, for example, accomplishing sanitary campaigns to combat HIV or malaria.

To authoritarianism, this author responded with the fact of institutional measures that have been taken to combat political rights violations. Through legal sanctions, as the Penal Code, Rwanda has, at the opposite, enforced national unity. However, Naftalin doesn't refute the existence of Political Rights violations were, for example, the opposition political leader was sentenced to 4 years of jail for "promoting divisionism".⁴³

For Grayson & Hitchcott, Rwandan stability needs to be seen in nuances. There've correct measures such as gender inclusion in country politics. RPF case of study is, for them, different than the common pattern followed by the *National Liberation Movements*, since, commonly, women are used to surpass the power combat processes, but they are relegated after power is achieved. In Rwanda, this was not the case as women become a relevant actor towards political landscape.⁴⁴ With the surpass of laws, the 25% of Rwanda's land belongs to women

⁴¹ Committee to Protect Journalists [CPJ], "Attacks on the Press 2003: Rwanda," CPJ, March 11, 2004, <http://cpj.org/2004/03/attacks-on-the-press-2003-rwanda.php>

⁴² Mark Naftalin, "Rwanda: A New Rwanda?" *The World Today* 67, no. 7 (2011): 22-24. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41962679>.

⁴³ Naftalin, "Rwanda: A New Rwanda?", 22-24.

⁴⁴ Hannah Grayson, and Nicki Hitchcott, eds. *Rwanda Since 1994: Stories of Change*, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2019), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvh9vw0t>.

-males only possess the 13%-. Today, Rwanda is the worldwide country with more women in a Parliament; in the Lower House the 61.3% of the seats are female, while in the Upper House the 38.5% is women dominated.⁴⁵

Furthermore, Freedom House states the precariousness of the political rights in the country. For the NGO, Paul Kagame is the result of unfair and fraudulent elections, the country electoral system is authoritative and controlled by the former government heads. Institutional postulates are null when empirically seen speaking. That's why, the annual political test the NGO expels set Rwanda as a Country that is practically "not free".⁴⁶

With this in mind, is undeniable to state that Rwanda has exponentially grown, economically speaking, since 1994. An economic liberalization of the country, mixed with a practical support for private sector, lead to an impressive 7.5% impressive GDP growth since 2000. It is probable that political continuation in hands of Paul Kagame has a correlation with country growth, therefore, stability seems to be based on coercion and constant violation to political and civil rights of the Rwandans. Authoritarianism can

be a catalyzer for national unity, since ethnical differences in power positions have, at least mediatically speaking, been appeased. More than stability, Rwanda has an authoritarian order.

RWANDA: A POLITICAL MODEL FOR AFRICA?

How Rwanda has passed from one of the darkest pasts, to a future that seems to set prosperity? Is undeniable to state that Rwanda has accomplish a long-term economic growth through a controlled liberalization of the economy. Therefore, stating Rwanda have reached prosperity led us to some relevant important questions. What is prosperity? Economic prosperity? Social prosperity? Political prosperity? Rwanda accomplished economic prosperity; social prosperity is debatable & political prosperity is deniable.

There is a starting point for understanding the contemporary history of Rwanda: 2003. This year acts as both a consequence & a cause. It's the consequence of the military order set looking forward in violence monopoly as a result of the Genocide, but it acts, at the same time, as a cause

⁴⁵ "Women in Parliaments," International Parliamentary Union [IPU], October 4, 2020, <http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/ClaSSif.htm>

⁴⁶ "Rwanda," Freedom House, October 4, 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda/freedom-world/2020>

for the economic prosperity and the certain stability of the XXI century Rwanda. RPF was able of establishing an order after the anarchy shown during 1994. The social stability was broke at the time, trust -that is the base of a State- fall apart as an answer of the Genocide. However, Paul Kagame figure will set a broader analysis of the Post-Genocide Regime.

Paul Kagame was set as a public face of the RPF; it was, in fact, an RPF negotiator in the development of the Arusha accords & the public speaker during the Civil War. He developed its political figure in positions of public recognition. Despite being part of an active actor during the Civil War, Kagame presented itself as an “activist”, claiming for the respect of the Arusha accords, the public stop of criminal activities against Tutsis, calling upon to the establishment of a national unity, etc. These positions, rather than identify him with the belligerent actors of the Civil War, take him to a recognition of a “illustrated” leader by both national electorate & international community majorities.

Within, 1994 RPF political consolidation through the Civil War could be seen as a material respect of the Rule of Law, since the military mobilization was presented as a defense of the Arusha accords more than a

unilateral invasion to take on power. These principles that lead to the belical development in 1994 in hands of the RPF are one probable cause of the non-mobilization against the new installed military regime. Furthermore, military regime, despite being a Tutsi power comeback, was an installation of an order & the centralization of the use of force. When the lack of order is evident, the people feel unsafe and the monopoly of violence falls apart to anarchy, a consolidation of order -with null hesitation of the leader’s political principles- is legitimized by the people. That same event is a constant in political history; when political power is atomized, the use of force for the consolidation of a central order is set as long as the sense of fear & lack of trust for the other citizen concludes. The most common materialization of this thesis is built around the French Revolution. When the pre-Revolution order was destroyed & the monarchy was slayed, the State submitted in anarchy. The atrocities and the lack of trust were seen & the figure of Napoleon appeared as a legitimize power. The ideals that set the Revolution, those in favor of political rights and liberties, were limited by Napoleon, the French seconded his power & resign to their political rights as long as the order was established. Rwandan example learned a lot by the French historical case.

Despite pillars against Tutsi-centric political regimes, the anarchy provoked by the Genocide was enough to relinquish to the initial principals & the de facto admissibility for the establishment of a military regime by a Tutsi-made armed group, RPF. The maintenance in power, however, can have an answer over the “illustrated leader” theory, since the day 1 Kagame claim for respect to the Arusha accords, and sold the government as a “Unitary regime”. In the cabinet, for example, they settle a number of Hutus as ministers, despite having the actual practical power positions over Tutsi domination, the Hutu ministers serve to the cause of a “Unity”. RPF made it to accomplish legitimacy through different forms & slowly destroying the probable future opposition with “political advance”. RPF categorically denied political favorability for Tutsis, maintain Hutu ministers as a façade & appeal to “Meritocracy” to justify the evident Tutsi majorities in political landscape. The democratic regime -if there was once some- was visibly destroyed & replaced by the RPF Regime; by 1996 four of the six Supreme Court judges, 80 percent of the mayors, permanent secretaries, were Tutsies. The RPF government, also, led to a Tutsi immigration from those that escape

during the Hutu regime; this catalyzed the Rwandan tutsification & manifest in a survey realized in 2000, were it stated that from the 169 more important power positions in Rwanda, 135 of the officeholders were from the RPF and 117 Tutsis.⁴⁷

RPF claim to a period of transition to last five years, from 1994 to 1999. During this period a party dictatorship grew to authoritarian levels. Press censorship was settled, defense & intelligence matters gain political relevance for the Bizimungu administration. Extraofficial executions took place against Hutu political leaders; between 1994 and 1998, Hutu civilians, political leaders & even Tutsi opposition members were killed or prosecuted, forcing the political elites and civil collectives to join the RPF as militates for their own integrity. Political horizontality was inevitably lost & social society vanished to the RPF policies. A question that may result is, then, why didn't the government fall?

Order & the image of a growing nation is the answer. RPF controlled the press & the media and the propaganda projected to the Rwandans look forward in presenting a growing changing nation; unity façade was still

⁴⁷ Filip Reyntjens, *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=nlebk&AN=638128&lang=es&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

evident despite political rights being strongly violated. But more importantly, the sense of order & security acted as a inhibitor for revolutions or revolts. Social manifestations intention is the elevation of inputs to the political apparatus, however, in the gross non-political society there was a sense of political order construction. RPF permeated to political administration, but it also assumed the formality of a national public force. RPF military wing was renamed as the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).

Rwandan case illustrates that the State exists for order rather than any other function. Defense & security is first, any other matter is an additive. Political liberty can be sacrificed if the sense of order needs to be constructed first; liberty can only be the result of a constructed apparatus that is able to maintain and function for security. Authoritarianism was maintained because it proves effective in constructing an ordered State, furthermore, it also presented the sense of a growing nation that in fact, was economically true since GDP went from a 0.753 Billion GDP in 1994 to a 1.9 Billion in 1999; this is, a 1.147 Billion growth in just 5 years; a direct consequence of a State centralization.

Centralization projects undergo through the elimination of a political opposition that could destabilize the order that slowly was settling. For eliminating opposition, extraofficial executions & arrests are the point of the iceberg, but the integration and manipulation of the cogens is need. To do so, the regime need to destroy the base of a political pluralism and, for it, all the imperatives that could lead to the creation of a different viewpoint that the one the regime needed were destroyed. The influence of international press, human rights defenders, or any kind of individual that through its ideas & viewpoints could create a civil society that oppose government was set apart using a military intelligence. The government was trying to be everywhere at any place, repelling the inputs that could lead to weakening the order.

The figure of Kagame maintain here as a figure of absolute power. Besides being the Vice-President of Bizimungu, Kagame was in a position of practical political superiority. He was both Vice-President & Minister of Defense. As the face of the RPF, of the end of Genocide & the authoritarian revolution that took on place Kagame was de facto Rwanda's leader.

Authoritarian or Totalitarian Revolution?

Rwanda is, today -and since 1994-, an authoritarian State. Empirical political monopolium in hands of the RPF, the destruction of a practical opposition, the desire of RPF to control all in a hermetic political landscape, the “illuminated leader” figure in hands of Paul Kagame & the ideal of a Growing nation -leader in Africa- supports this thesis

However, it's important to analyze if Rwanda could not be a totalitarianism instead of an authoritarianism. In fact, some figures of what a State as North Korea, USSR or Nazi Germany could be found in Rwanda. Is, therefore, Rwanda a totalitarianism? The closest to a totalitarianism in Rwanda occurred between 1994 & 2000, still there it was not a totalitarianism itself. Furthermore, before going deeper to this explanation, the question as to whether if what happen since 1994 could be understand as a revolution must be answered.

Before 1994, Hutu ethnicity had been in power for more than 30 years; since the official independence we can't speak of a Tutsi regime in Rwanda. Quite the opposite, Tutsis were prosecuted & massacred under Kayibanda regime. UNAR & RADER

parties were eliminated from political landscape and, when Habyarimana administration coup & set in place, it just endures these policies against Tutsis. Since he was set as the head of Rwanda's national guard & major general, Habyarimana impulse an authoritarian State with a firm policy against Tutsi ethnicity.

Since the Rwandan independence, authoritarianism was the structure of the political landscape. A formal Party dictatorship was adopted formally by Habyarimana, *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND)* was once the only political party in Rwanda. There was not a Revolution in Rwanda during 1994. In fact, RPF inherited a authoritarian configuration from the MRND. Structure was not destroyed; it was inherited & adapted by the RPF.

With this in mind, we may know pre-1994 Rwanda, despite being a authoritarian regime, it was not totalitarian. A totalitarianism looks forward in accomplishing a hermetic State, where not only individuals but information itself can't get in or out, its true political inputs structure over the one-party system & that political structure was absorbed by the MRND, it can be partly true that a self-power figure was set over Habyarimana -& even was glorified by its people as a “celestial”

leader-, however it was not totalitarian since it failed in accomplishing the totalitarian hermetic State. Information, ideas & opposition itself was still visible both externally and internally. The existence of the RPF and the development of the Civil War prove that Habyarimana was not able of reaching a State where there is not possible confrontation for power. Opposition was still possible & the non-accomplishing of a hermetic regime, made external leaks that led to the RPF introduction in the panorama.

Now, when RPF take on power, it inherited this scheme. The leader figure was now set in Paul Kagame & the party dictatorship was changed to the RPF policy. Therefore, still today the system is authoritarian -not totalitarian-. Rwanda is world open, at least economically speaking. RPF made it in adapting a free market economic institutions that *A priori* attempt against the hermetic State policy. It's true, also, RPF was able to absorb political landscape over the party, in fact, political landscape itself is the party. But there is not hermetic State in Rwanda. Ideas can still leak in the country, and opposition can still be possible. External international opposition and critics can be found still and reveal towards international observers. A question may appear now; if there is no hermeticity in Rwanda, if the possibility of

oppositional ideas leaking is possible, why there are no revolts or significant material political competition?

Rwanda is an authoritarian regime, there is no doubt about it. This authoritarianism, where external-internal ideas leak is still possible, has not materialize in a defiance to Kagame because of two factors: RPF power & economic prosperity. First, the accumulated power by the RPF, & Kagame itself, made it possible for the party to crush any potential opposition. Despite the 2003 constitution claiming for a visible democracy, competition is null. At difference to what happen to the MRND, RPF was able to gain the popular legitimization, of both Tutsis & Hutus, through the Genocide & the economy. The proclamation of the political order after the anarchy that the Genocide set, put aside the ethnic considerations to legitimize the RPF with null practical opposition. Furthermore, the irrefutable economic prosperity that the party has managed to accomplish traduces in Rwandans being willing to renounce to their political rights by looking forward to their income growth. The rent & life quality increase over Kagame regime is enough to step down the possibility of a revolt or a notable opposition. Rwandans have adopted a conservative culture, for maintaining the regime & increasing their income rather than

producing a probable opposition that could cut down the fantastic economic development Rwanda has made.

Kagame effect

An elected President with more than 98% of suffrage, with a minoritarian ethnicity & a 20-year administration continuation is not too democratic. Despite proclaiming President in 2000, Kagame has been the actual face of the post-Genocide Rwanda since 1994. He was the actual power figure during the 1994-1999 period by possessing both Vice-presidency, Ministry of defence & RPF leadership -legislative power-, during this period. Bizimungu's presidency complemented Kagame by presenting the face of ethnical reconciliation between Hutu -that Bizimungu was- & Tutsis -Kagame and the RPF-. Kagame was, therefore, the de facto President then.

Bizimungu was a moderate Hutu. Despite being President over a RPF legislative & political majority, he openly criticized the party, and this was enough for Kagame to replace him. In 2000 he resigned as an active President and was, in fact, sentenced

to prison by Kagame administration.⁴⁹

⁵⁰ RPF strategy to eliminate political competence is associating its opposition with preachers of ethnic hatred, which was exactly what happened to Bizimungu when creating the alternative party, *Party for Democracy and Renewal* (PDR) in 2000. This precedent illustrates the actual power Kagame holds since 1994.

Kagame can even be related with Putin -maintaining its proportions of course-. A history of a collapsing nation after a tragical event for the public opinion, a leader that took on place when the country needed him the most & set up the political and social order. In both cases, there's a figure of an "illustrated leader", a null public political integration and the lack of a Civil Society in the political landscape.

In March 2000, as a consequence of the resignation of Bizimungu, Kagame was set as interim President. Since the country was still the "transition period" & none constitution established regime, Kagame was elected as the official President by an RPF national assembly. With RPF controlling the

⁴⁹ In 2004, BBC announced the destination of Bizimungu, when he was declared as a ethnic statu quo subversive. Kagame banned the PDR party and put Bizimungu in House arrest in April 2002; Amnesty international (2002), even declared Bizimungu was a prisoner of conscience. He was then sentenced to jail for 15 years because he continued operating the illegal PDR party & manifesting ethnic hatred. After 3 years in prison, Bizimungu was pardon by Kagame in 2007.

⁵⁰ Amnesty International, Rwanda: Number Of Prisoners Of Conscience On The Rise, (June 2002), <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/112000/afr470022002en.pdf>

legislative power, Kagame was elected with an eighty-one to three votes against Charles Murigande & sworn as the institutional President in April -formalizing a position of power that he holds since 1994-.

A new period, however, was set in 2003. That year the new Constitution was presented, claiming for a democratic regime with multi-party institutions. 2003 Charter constructed over the Genocide precedent and establishes a State of unity that merge the interests of both Tutsi & Hutu ethnicities in one same nation. That same original constitution strict the mandate of a President to a 7-year term⁵¹ and the possibility of an active President of only being re-elected once -no more than two terms are allowed by the constitution-. The constitution, despite its ethnic considerations, has given arguments to the RPF to disparage its opposition. In the constitution preamble is set that “*divisionism based on ethnicity, region or on any other ground*” must be eradicated.⁵² This foundational principle, noble and fundamental for an identity construction, has been the institutional justification by the party for dismantling competition by incriminating any alternative actor as an insurgent that’ll affect the

national unity and escalate ethnical division. It has been used by Kagame for sabotage electoral contest & candidates themselves.

With the Constitutional scheme set, Presidential and legislative elections took place in that same year. Clearly, State apparatus worked towards the Kagame’s election as the first suffrage elected president of the XXI century. Opposition was in clear disadvantages against RPF in both legislative and Presidential elections, since the recently introduced electoral code was State interpreted in favor of the party. The *Mouvement démocratique républicain* (MDR), presented as the main opposition party, with Faustin Twagiramungu as the running candidate against Kagame. MDR campaign was in disadvantage in different situations, financial resources were one of them. The recently introduced electoral code prohibited State support to contestants, but it also didn’t set a limit on how much campaigns could spend. RPF has clear advantages over opposition parties regards financial resources, therefore the electoral code prohibits State financial support, it doesn’t regulate State spending. State programmes & clear financial advantages play a roll. There’s evidence that

⁵¹ This term length was modified in a 2015 referendum, where rwandans decide to shorten the Presidential term to a five-year duration.

⁵² Constitution Rwandaise [Const.] (2003).

Kagame and RPF members introduced donation programmes to local communities, where the candidates donate cows and goats: situation that play a role in influencing electorate in favor of the RPF.⁵³ However, disadvantage was best presented when RPF incriminated MDR party of affecting ethnical unity. As an answer, MDR was banned from the electoral landscape and Twagiramungu was forced to run as an independent. This political landscape, lead to an expected election of Kagame as President with 95% of the votes, while Twagiramungu reached an scarce 3.62%. In regard to legislative power, RPF coalition was also elected with 73.78% favorable seats in the Chamber of Deputies.⁵⁴

Kagame was, once more, in power. Elections formalized its administration and set the political route of the country for the next years. RPF was legitimized constitutionally speaking and now, after 9 years of political transition to the new constitution, political establishment take on the whole political scheme with the fundament of Universal Suffrage. Political continuation could be a consequence of the lack of a democratic culture in the Rwandans. Since its independence, Rwanda has

never presented a democratically speaking election Historically, monarchic institutions characterize the political landscape, unipolar institutionalism was continued by Kayibanda & then by Habyarimana. Furthermore, multiparty institutions were null during the whole Rwandan history and, despite of RPF suppressing political competition, 2003 Constitutional system is the most horizontal scheme ever adopted.

The legitimized authoritarian scheme, that answers to economic progress & the establishment of a monopoly on violence, complements its explanation with the political culture. After 1994, the economic growth of the country that reflected in an undeniable growing income for the Rwandans, traduces in a conservative political attitude & an input passiveness by the political actors that de facto licenses regime manutention. Adopted multiparty institutions in 2003 failed because there was never a democratic culture and the electorate was used to continuation towards unipolarity. Moreover, with the economic progress by the party, electorate adopted a conservadurist behavior, resigning to

⁵³ Ingrid Samset, and Orrvar Dalby, Rwanda: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2003 (Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of Human Rights[NOR-DEM], 2003), 27, <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/1770-rwanda-presidential-and-parliamentary-elections.pdf>

⁵⁴ Samset, and Dalby, Rwanda: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, 48.

political multipolarity conditioned over life quality augmentation.

The economic miracle

After the anarchy of 1994 regards social, political & economical scheme destruction, Rwandan economy made it in constructing a path of progress. Between 2001 and 2018, economy has expanded in a 8.1% annual average increase, reaching a 10.122 Billion dollars GDP in 2019; ensuring a 2% growth even with the coronavirus pandemic global recession.^{55 56}

Kagame adopted a market liberalization through the coffee & tea agricultural sector. Legal requirements for agricultural international trade were removed, what led to the dramatic increase of exportations & capital investment. With legal flexibilization, business environment was created and impulsed by the government, what catalogues Rwanda as one of the bests business environments if continental Africa. Agriculture economic expansion is based in encouraging the use of modern inputs in the production of priority crops.⁵⁷

Economic miracle, although is constructed over a deficit government budget balance regards both trade balance & internal financial statements. Exports are based in primary goods that set their prices in regard to the international markets, fluctuations are, then, an issue that the general trade balance suffers. It's true the economy spectacular growth has no precedent in Africa; therefore, economy is strictly dependent of foreign aid & international bank loans, that catalyze government spending -and increase life quality of Rwandans- but augment national debt.

Kagame was obligated to request an 18-months US\$204 million credit facility to avoid bankruptcy, that loan was approved in 2016, and half was outlay that same year.⁵⁸ International Finance Corporation (IFC) investment portfolio, for example, states a US\$84 million in advisory services for Rwandans.⁵⁹

In addition, Rwandan economy is highly dependent of foreign aid. After the Genocide, and with the liberalization policies adopted by Kagame,

⁵⁵ Charles Nweze, *The Unprecedented Economic Growth and Development of Rwanda* (Prague: Institute For Politics and Society, 2018), 1-3, <https://www.politikaspolecnost.cz/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Rwandas-Economic-Growth-and-Development-IPPS.pdf>

⁵⁶ C" Gross Domestic Product: Rwanda."

⁵⁷ African Development Bank & Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Rwanda", in *African Economic Outlook* (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006), 431-443, <https://www.oecd.org/dev/36741760.pdf>

⁵⁸ George Ayittey, "The Non-Sustainability of Rwanda's Economic Miracle," *Journal of Management and Sustainability* Vol. 7, No. 2 (2017): 93, <https://doi.org/10.5539/jms.v7n2p88>.

⁵⁹ "Rwanda: Overview," World Bank, June, 2015, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview#2>.

international aid for re-construction & liberal economical scheme construction was necessary. In 2011, United Kingdom, the second Rwanda's higher donor after the United States, announced a bilateral aid of 535 million dollars, while Belgium did the same with a cooperation of 160 million euros.⁶⁰ Rwanda's transition from aid is necessary & can be found through the construction of a competent financial sector that can relieve regime pressure over foreign credit for continuing expansionary fiscal policies with an internal budget increase market.⁶¹

Economy has been the grand base of RPF for maintaining the passive attitude towards political landscape. If there has not been a revolt in Rwanda or a material political opposition nowadays, after the order has been set & more than 20 years have passed since 1994, is because of income increase that Rwandans have seen. Conservative attitudes that legitimize regime have an answer in these economic results, where electorate is willing to resign to its political rights over economic prosperity. A visible Civil Society is null because individuals are passive since they perceive a life quality increase, evidentially they put private life development first than public lands-

cape horizontality. If authoritarianism is needed to set a continuation of private life progress, Rwandese are minded in. Passive attitudes can correlate with the non-existence of a democratical political culture, since never in Rwanda's history there has been actual horizontal multiparty institutions &, despite the undeniable infringements RPF has made over political life and Human Rights, 2003 Constitution has been the most horizontal Constitution in Rwanda's political history. Nevertheless, relinquishment to political rights is conditioned to private income increase and if the regime is not able to accomplish this general input, its manutention in power will be doubtful. With 2020 world economy recession due to coronavirus pandemic, Kagame is facing a historic challenge that could put in the line the credibility of his regime.

CONCLUSION

Never in the history of Rwanda there has been an empirical democratic regime. In 1994, Genocide set a political system to ashes due to an ethnical division between Tutsis and Hutus, that was augmented because of a colonial era iniquity in access

⁶⁰ Naftalin, "Rwanda: A New Rwanda?" 22-24.

⁶¹ World Bank, Rwanda Economic Update: Financing Development in Rwanda (Kigali: World Bank, 2015), <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/publication/rwanda-economic-update-financing-development-role-deeper-diversified-financial-sector>

to power. Since its independence & the abolition of monarchy, authoritarianism characterize the political organization scheme of Rwanda. This authoritarianism was first legitimized in ethnical sectarianism during Kayibanda regime & then materialize in a formal one-party system during Habyarimana administration.

The figure of the MRND party transform Rwanda to a party dictatorship that formally organized politics unilaterally. With the 1994 Genocide, RPF take on power & the unipolar regime was inherited to establish a new party dictatorship that appeared over the leadership of Paul Kagame. This new regime, appeal to morality by using the Genocide as an argument for legitimation and establish a 9-year period of re-organization where power was strictly accumulated in the RPF.

Control of media, political opposition and the whole public panorama was centered in the party. Nevertheless, the concentration of power serves to the cause of centralization of politics, and the establishment of the violence monopoly that was destroyed by the chaos generated in Genocide. To gain recognition, RPF, despite being a Tutsi centered movement, claim to a “national unity” that put aside the ethnical divisions through a multiethnic government. However, this

idea of horizontality RPF declared was a façade for public acknowledgement. Instead, public offices were filled with Tutsi members of the RPF & the acting Hutu President between 1994 & 1999 complemented Paul Kagame for its own power legitimation. In fact, in 1999 Bizimungu resigned & Kagame complete the formal institutionalization of its power. Within, political opposition was left apart &, when interfering with RPF, it was dismantled with accusations of being insurgents that’ll affect the national unity and escalate ethnical division. This was best illustrated during 2003. In that same year, the new Constitution was presented & the new institutional order set a democratic regime with multiparty institutions. However, authoritarianism maintain de facto since political competition is null because opposition power is limited for contest. In that year Presidential elections, for example, the only visible contestant against Kagame, was sabotaged and was forced to run as an independent when the government banned the MDR party accusing it from escalating ethnical division.

Prosperity in Rwanda is only visible economically & private speaking, but not politically. Authoritarian order maintains still because of economy, the sense of order and Political Culture. After the Genocide anarchy was set and the sense of a lack of order was

present. The pillars against Tutsi-centric political regime that a Hutu majority claim, were left apart as a consequence of the anarchy. Individuals relinquish to the initial principals & the de facto recognize the establishment of a military regime by a Tutsi-made armed group, RPF. When order is destroyed, people can renounce to its political inputs and claim for security as the main common input.

Furthermore, Rwanda has never accomplished an empirical democratical institutions in its whole political history, what means that a democratic Political Culture was never cultivated. Authoritarianism was legitimized due to economic progress -that is undeniable-, the life quality increase Rwandese have seen since Kagame took on power is enough to adopt a conservatist behaviour towards political landscape. Despite political opposition is materially null and that democratic institutions adopted during 2003 are no more than a façade of the RPF party dictatorship that governs since 1994, electorate will remain passive as far as its private life continues with an income and life quality increase.

If RPF is able to maintain economic development of the country, it will ensure its power without a visible opposition. However, the government faces a budget deficit that reflects

the cost of public spending & increases its dependence from international credit loans and foreign aid. Budget issues that seem a worst panorama with the 2020 coronavirus recession public spending government is forced to realize. With this path of economic instability, days are numbered for a collapse.

REFERENCES

African Development Bank & Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. "Rwanda." In African Economic Outlook, edited by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 431-443. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006, ISBN: 92-64-022430 / <https://www.oecd.org/dev/36741760.pdf>

"Elections in Rwanda." African Elections Database, October 13, 2011. Last modified October 5, 2020. <http://africanelections.tripod.com/rw.html>.

Amnesty International. Rwanda: Number of prisoners of conscience on the rise. AFR 47/002/2002 ed. June, 2002. Last modified November 1, 2020. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/112000/afr470022002en.pdf>

Annan, Kofi. *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*. ed. Thompson, Allan. London: Pluto Press, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt18fs550>.

Ayittey, George. "The Non-Sustainability of Rwanda's Economic Miracle." *Journal of Management and Sustainability* Vol. 7, No. 2 (March 2017): 90-95. <https://doi.org/10.5539/jms.v7n2p88>

Gunn, H. D. "Les Peuples Et Les Civilisations De L'Afrique, Suivi De Les Langues Et L'éducation. Par H. Baumann Et D. Westermann. Traduction Française Par L. Homburger. Préface De Théodore Monod. Payot: Paris, 1948. Pp. 605, 461 Figures, 23 Cartes. 1,000 Fr." *Africa* 19, no. 4 (1949): 339-40. doi:10.2307/1156411

"From president to prison." BBC News. June 7, 2004. Last modified November 1, 2020. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3728807.stm>

Blaug, Ricardo, John Schwarzmantel. *Democracy: A Reader*. Edition. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000, <https://gabrielaslotta.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/how-far-can-free-government-travel-sartori.pdf>

"Attacks on the Press 2003: Rwanda." Committee to Protect Jour-

nalists [CPJ]. March 11, 2004. Last modified November 8, 2020. <http://cpj.org/2004/03/attacks-on-the-press-2003-rwanda.php>.

Constitution Rwandaise [Const.] Kigali: Digithèque MJP, 1978. Last modified October 5, 2020. <https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/mjp.htm>

Constitution Rwandaise [Const.]. Kigali: Constituteproject.org, 2003. Last modified October 5, 2020. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Rwanda_2015.pdf?lang=en

Dallaire, Roméo. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. London: Arrow, 2005. ISBN 978-0-09-947893-5 / <https://archive.org/details/shakehandswithde00dall>

"Rwanda." Freedom House. October 4, 2020. Last modified October 4, 2020. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda/freedom-world/2020>.

Gahama, Joseph. *Le Burundi sous administration belge*. Paris: CRA-Karthala-ACCT, 1983. https://www.persee.fr/doc/outre_0300-9513_1986_num_73_271_2536_t1_0240_0000_7

Grayson, Hannah, Nicki Hitchcott, eds. *Rwanda Since 1994: Stories of Change*. Liverpool: Liverpool Univer-

sity Press, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvh9vw0t>.

“Women in Parliaments.” International Parliamentary Union [IPU]. 2020. Last modified October 4, 2020. <http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/ClaSSif.htm>.

Kapoor, Radhika. “Propaganda and Genocide: Setting Standards for Responsibility.” *Socio-Legal Review* 15, no. 1 (2019): 75-83. <https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/soclere-v15&i=1>.

Lemonik, Mikaila. *Genocide*. s.l.: Salem Press Encyclopedia, 2019.

Levitsky, Steven, Lucan Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism : Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Problems of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=nlebk&AN=331320&lang=es&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

Linden, Ian. “Church and Revolution in Rwanda.” *The Journal of African History* 19, no. 4 (1977): 631–33. doi:10.1017/S0021853700016595

Mamdani, Mahmood. *When Victims Become Killers*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Mill, John. *On Liberty*. 2 ed. London: John W.Parker & Son, 1860.

Naftalin, Mark. “Rwanda: A New Rwanda?.” *The World Today* 67, no. 7 (2011): 22-24. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41962679>.

Newbury, Catherine. *The cohesion of oppression: clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Newman, James. *The peopling of Africa : a geographic interpretation*. New Haven : Yale University Press, 1995. <https://archive.org/details/peoplingofafrica00newmrch/page/164/mode/2up?q=RWANDA>

Nweze, Charles. *The Unprecedented Economic Growth and Development of Rwanda*. Prague: Institute For Politics and Society, 2018. <https://www.politikaspolecnost.cz/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Rwandas-Economic-Growth-and-Development-IPPS.pdf>

Prunier, Gérard. *The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994*. London: Hurst & Co., 1998. ISBN 9781850653721

Reyntjens, Filip. “Behind the Facade of Rwanda’s Elections.” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 12, no. 2 (2011): 64–69. <https://search.ebsco>

host-com.ez.unisabana.edu.co/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.geojaf12.33&lang=es&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Reyntjens, Filip. Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=nlebk&AN=638128&lang=es&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

Samset, Ingrid, and Orrvar Dalby. Rwanda: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2003. Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of Human Rights [NORDEM], 2003. ISBN: 82-90851-61-8 / <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/1770-rwanda-presidential-and-parliamentary-elections.pdf>

Schmitt, Carl. Der Hüter der Verfassung. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1931. <https://ernster.com/annotstream/9783428149216/PDF/Schmitt-Carl/Der-HA%C2%BC-ter-der-Verfassung.pdf>

Sellström, Tor, Lennar Wohlgemuth, Patrick Dupont, Karin Schiebe, “Historical perspective: some explanatory factors. Part I of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda.” In The International Response to Con-

flict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996. <https://www.oecd.org/derec/unitedstates/50189653.pdf>

United Nations. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Paris: United Nations, 1948.

United Nations Library. Petition from the “Rassemblement Democratique Ruandais (RADER)”, the “Mouvement Pour l’Union Ruandaise (MUR)”, the “Union des Masses Ruandaises (UMAR)”, the “Union Nationale Ruandaise (UNAR)” and the “Mouvement Monarchiste Ruandais (MOMOR)” concerning Ruanda-Urundi. New York: United Nations, 1960. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1658367?ln=es>

“Outreach Programme on the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda and the United Nations”, United Nations. 2020. Last modified October 5, 2020. <https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/historical-background.shtml>.

“Rwanda: Background”, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda [UNAMIR]. 2020. Last modified October 5, 2020. <https://pea->

cekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unamirFT.htm.

United Nations Development Programme. [UNDP]. “Briefing note for countries on the 2019 Human Development Report: Rwanda.” UNDP. 2019. Last modified October 5, 2020. <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr-theme/country-notes/RWA.pdf>

Vansina, Jan. L'Évolution du royaume Rwanda des origines à 1900. Brussels: Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre Mer, 1962.

Voegelin, Eric, Gilbert Weiss, Ruth Hein. The Authoritarian State: an Essay on the Problem of the Austrian State. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999. <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=->

[cat06493a&AN=sab.000180332&lang=es&site=eds-live&scope=site](https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/publication/rwanda-economic-update-financing-development-role-deeper-diversified-financial-sector).

World Bank. Rwanda Economic Update: Financing Development in Rwanda. Kigali: World Bank, 2015. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/publication/rwanda-economic-update-financing-development-role-deeper-diversified-financial-sector>

“Rwanda: Overview.” World Bank. 2015. Last modified November 2, 2020. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview#2>

“Gross Domestic Product: Rwanda.” World Bank. 2020. Last modified November 1, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=RW>